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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to present crucial shortcomings of research into eyewitness testimony. It presents the state-of-
the-art of research on the relationship between emotions and memory performance. In addition, it addresses contradictions 
and concerns about previous studies. Despite the declarations of consensus on the role of emotions in memory coding and 
retrieving, there are as many studies suggesting that emotional events are better remembered than neutral ones, as there are 
reports that show the opposite. Therefore, by indicating the theoretical and methodological limitations of previous studies, 
this paper advocates a more rigorous approach to the investigation of emotions and their impact on the quality and quantity 
of testimony. It also provides a framework for inquiry that allows better comparisons between studies and results, and may 
help to build a more comprehensive theory of the effects of emotion on memory
Introduction
Eyewitnesses often make mistakes, misreport and misi-
dentify; thus, some of them are unreliable sources of infor-
mation. There is hardly a textbook on the psychology of 
eyewitness testimony that suggests otherwise. After more 
than 40 years of research on memory relating to criminal 
events, this notion is increasingly accepted outside the field 
of academic psychology and influences legal proceedings 
and decisions.
However, with growing awareness of human memory 
limitations and its consequences for eyewitness testimony 
comes a discussion about the status of knowledge based on 
laboratory research. For many decades, almost every empiri-
cal article in the field discusses shortcomings of research. 
Yet, they rarely include practical guidelines on how to 
improve research. As a consequence of questionable meth-
odological basis, there is no shortage of controversy over 
conflicting results. This seems particularly evident in the 
case of research on the influence of emotions on eyewitness 
testimony, which only superficially seems to have been 
resolved.
The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the short-
comings of laboratory research concerning the effect of 
emotions on memory performance, and to analyse the con-
sequences for comprehension and the application of empiri-
cal findings. Moreover, it will address them by suggesting a 
theoretical and methodological framework that may benefit 
research and serve as general guidelines for improving the 
quality of studies. In consequence, it will be easier to draw 
solid, well-grounded conclusions about the role of emotions 
in memory performance.
It should be noted that this paper is not a systematic 
review of the issue. Readers interested in more general 
knowledge on the application of eyewitness testimony 
research may refer to other papers available in the literature 
(e.g. Chae, 2010; Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001; 
Wagstaff, MaCveigh, Boston, Scott, Brunas-Wagstaff, & 
Cole, 2003).
What do we know about emotions 
and eyewitness testimony?
Eyewitness testimony is a legal term that refers to an account 
of a crime given by an individual who has seen or been 
involved in that event. It often includes not only bystanders 
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but also victims. Eyewitness testimony can have different 
forms, from a description of an event or a perpetrator, to 
the identification of suspects or important objects such as 
weapons or vehicles. For many decades, research on eye-
witness testimony has focused on the identification of indi-
vidual, situational, environmental, and system variables that 
impact the quality and quantity of testimony. Consequently, 
we acknowledge now that eyewitness evidence may not be 
as reliable as we used to think.
Among estimator variables, a category including factors 
that discount or augment the credibility of eyewitnesses 
(Wells, 1978), which can be only considered post factum, 
emotions are often discussed. Crime is a stressful experience 
for victims and for witnesses. Even an accidental bystander 
may become emotionally involved. The common suspicion 
and distrust we have about emotions and people showing 
them have led us to consider them a source of memory 
errors. However, as we will see, studies do not always con-
firm this notion.
The question of how emotions impact the way crimi-
nal events are remembered was first asked by pioneers of 
applied psychology. One of the first experiments on the 
subject, described in Münsterberg’s essay (1908/2009), was 
conducted by von Liszt at the University of Berlin, at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. The experiment, which 
simulated a life-threatening situation, showed that memories 
of unexpected events accompanied by fear and a sense of 
danger are more distorted and misreported than emotionally 
neutral events.
There are many more recent studies that support this 
claim. It is considered that stressful stimuli negatively 
impact memory of perpetrator characteristics, pertinent 
actions, and details of crime scenes. The notion is evidenced 
by laboratory experiments and case studies (Clifford & Hol-
lin; 1981, Kuehn, 1974; Loftus & Burns, 1982, Southwick, 
Morgan, Nicolaou, & Charney, 1997, Takahashi, Itsukush-
ima & Okabe, 2006; for a meta-analysis see Deffenbacher, 
Bornstein, Penrod, & McGorty, 2004). It is possible that 
negative emotions have detrimental effects on the recon-
solidation of episodic memory through stress hormones 
(Schwabe & Wolf, 2010).1 In consequence, as Bornstein 
and Robicheaux (2008, p. 525) state: “the expert consensus 
on eyewitness memory and arousal is that in most respects, 
arousal exerts a negative effect on eyewitness performance”.
However, if we take a closer look at the research results, 
the only obvious thing is that the influence of emotions on 
testimony is far from obvious. There seems to be as much 
evidence of the negative impact of emotions on the reliability 
of eyewitness testimony as there is evidence to the contrary. 
Empirical findings suggest that memory of stressful events 
tends to be accurate, as evidenced by research in eyewit-
ness testimony (e.g. Block, Greenberg & Goodman, 2009; 
Christiansona & Hübinette, 1993; Christianson et al., 1991; 
Houston, Clifford, Phillips, & Memon, 2013; Maras, Gaigg 
& Bowler, 2012; Smeets, Candel & Merckelbach, 2004), as 
well as in the more general approach (e.g. Anderson, Wais 
& Gabrieli, 2006; Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2017; Bradley, 
Greenwald, Petry & Lang, 1992; Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton & 
Schacter, 2007; Laney, Campbell, Heuer & Reisberg, 2004).
A good example of the difficulties in reconciling research 
results is the issue of the weapon focus effect (WFE), a phe-
nomenon describing the allocation of attention resources on 
highly emotive, threatening objects and, in consequence, 
reduced ability to describe or identify an offender and other 
details of the event. The overall significant difference in 
identification accuracy in weapon-present and weapon-
absent conditions has been demonstrated (Steblay, 1992; 
Fawcett, Russell, Peace & Christie, 2013). However, Hulse 
and Memon (2006) showed that, while the presence of a 
weapon increases arousal, it does not always inhibit recog-
nition accuracy. Some studies also suggest that the effect 
may not be as general as usually presented (e.g. Carlson & 
Carlson, 2012).
Therefore, the only consensus we can acknowledge is on 
the differences in remembering emotional versus neutral 
stimuli. Especially as it is supported by evidence showing 
distinct neural patterns of information processing depending 
on the stimulus valence and arousal (Kensinger & Corkin, 
2004).
In the light of many contradicting results, questions about 
their applicability outside laboratory settings, and concerns 
about the validity of conditions and mental states created in 
a lab, the debate about the current state-of-the-art of eye-
witness testimony research is hardly surprising. However, 
acknowledgment that the research on eyewitnesses’ emo-
tions may not reflect reality is only the starting point. The 
next step would be to discuss possible reasons why we are 
still unsure how to estimate the impact of emotions experi-
enced by eyewitnesses on their memory performance.
How eyewitness testimony research goes 
astray
Two separate issues should be considered when systema-
tising knowledge in this field. The first concerns the way 
memory is studied and discussed. In the author’s opinion, 
contradictions are essentially the result of excessive sim-
plifications in the presentation of research results, and of 
too far-reaching conclusions drawn from examination of a 
particular memory process. It seems that the influence of 
1 However, as Payne et al. (2007) demonstrated, stress induced prior 




emotions on memory may not be broad and general, as it is 
sometimes portrayed. The impact seems to vary depending 
on memory function under investigation (recollection and 
recognition), the paradigm used to test memory (free recall, 
structured recall, etc.) and the content of a memory (central 
versus peripheral details, faces versus objects, etc.). Consid-
ering those nuances in study reports should be a common 
practice rather than a brief element of research discussion.
The second issue concerns emotions. While analysing 
research papers on the relations between affective states and 
memory performance, one may conclude that the vast body 
of theoretical and empirical studies on emotions are taken 
into account insufficiently. Thus, this paper will discuss three 
major issues concerning the way emotions are addressed and 
investigated in eyewitness testimony research, and which 
may be why we face difficulties when comparing study 
results. These concerns involve the way emotions are (1) 
defined, (2) induced and (3) measured in laboratory settings.
Defining emotions
It is a convenient truism that emotions are difficult to define. 
As interest in research on emotions intensified in the late 
1980s, almost every major theorist developed a distinctive 
concept of what emotions are and how they differ from 
other related affective states, such as moods or attitudes. 
The wealth of terms and definitions should not, however, 
be an excuse to ignore the body of knowledge related to the 
theory of emotions. Unfortunately, it is common to get the 
impression that, in the case of forensic psychology experi-
ments, the word “emotion” is considered self-defining—a 
concept that needs no further explanation.
Typically, most research investigating human emotions 
falls into one of two theoretical categories—discrete or 
dimensional. The first approach views emotions as specific 
affective states that can be labelled (e.g. anxiety, fear, anger, 
etc.), while the other describes them according to the dimen-
sional space of their core properties—valence, arousal, and 
less often, dominance. Even though it cannot be said that 
one or the other is more or less correct, the dimensional 
approach is more likely to focus on the fundamental organi-
sation of emotions (Scherer, 2005). When this approach is 
employed, at least two affective dimensions (arousal and 
valence) should also be considered. However, studies are 
typically focused on one or the other (Bradley, 1994).
The lack of precision in defining the area of interest is 
noticeable in eyewitness testimony research. A wide range 
of terms is used to name affective states, such as negative 
emotions, arousal or stress. There is often no reflection on 
what these terms imply, or on the theoretical methodological 
consequences of their use. When we look more closely at 
research subjects and objectives, we can see that the terms 
chosen for independent variables are rarely set within the 
theoretical framework. Furthermore, they only seemingly 
relate to the approaches described above. In consequence, 
as the concepts are used arbitrarily and thoughtlessly, some 
studies answer questions other than those which they ask.
Negative emotion
When using the term negative emotion, emphasis seems to 
be on the valence—the subjective meaning an individual 
gives to a stimulus. However, eyewitness testimony research 
commonly uses the term primarily to investigate the discrete 
emotions—fear, anger, anxiety—not the pleasant–unpleas-
ant dimension. It serves as a category that includes basic/
modal emotions that are a priori associated with unpleasant 
experiences. The term also seems to describe the implicit 
negative tone of the criminal event, not the affective state of 
an eyewitness per se.
However, a research problem formulated in this fashion 
entails the risk of investigating artifacts. As particular nega-
tive emotions differ in terms of their properties, function, 
and behavioural and physiological reactions, it is the author’s 
opinion they may influence memory coding in distinct ways. 
The category includes very different affective states (such as 
anger/rage and fear/anxiety), yet equating them and studying 
them as one may provide misleading results. For example, 
during experimental manipulation one subject may expe-
rience fear/anxiety, while another feels anger, with both 
labelled ‘negative emotion’. In quantitative studies, the 
impact of the first may be neutralised by the very different 
effect caused by the latter. Anger serves as preparedness 
for attack, as motivation to approach the stimulus. Fear/
anxiety, on the other hand, evokes the behavioural tendency 
to escape or avoid the stimulus. In consequence, while the 
subject experiencing anger may be strongly focused on the 
stimulus that caused it, the other may divert their attention 
away from the stimulus. Thus, the inconclusive study results.
It is also reasonable to ask which of these discrete emo-
tions (or rather, what kind of their configuration) reflect the 
actual experiences of eyewitnesses and can, therefore, serve 
as the best analogy of those experiences. Intuition suggests 
that, when a witness observes a situation in which someone 
suffers physical harm or threat to life, they first experience 
fear/anxiety. Seeing a verbal, non-physical attack may cause 
anger rather than fear. Thus, when adopting the discrete 
approach, it seems crucial to analyse the impact of emo-
tions on testimony in a more nuanced way. Considering the 
term “negative emotion” collectively does not necessarily 
explain the relationship between affective state and memory, 
nor does it provide insight into eyewitness experience.
On the other hand, if the concept of negative emotion 
is used in terms of the dimensional approach, it may have 
different implications for research design. While drawing 
attention to the subjective valence of emotional experience, 
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the next logical step would be to examine how memory is 
affected depending on stimulus assessment on a scale from 
unpleasant to pleasant. Moreover, as the psychology of 
eyewitness testimony is interested in unpleasant events, it 
would be ideal to differentiate the level of unpleasantness of 
stimuli by manipulating it from the least unpleasant to the 
most unpleasant. This approach would facilitate accurate and 
appropriate investigation into valence.
However, to examine how negative emotions impact 
memory, it is crucial to create an event that truly evokes the 
required emotional reaction. Given ethical constraints, labo-
ratory experiments may not include a stimulus that evokes 
negative emotions—only one that does not evoke positive 
ones. There is also a possibility that the reaction of a subject 
exposed to a stimulus is not at all an emotion but a startle-
ment or surprise, which are, for some scholars, instinctive 
reactions (e.g. Ekman, Friesen & Simon, 1985).
To sum up, it is suggested that, if the term negative emo-
tion in fact applies the discrete approach, a study should 
examine the variations between the influence of different 
types of emotions on the reliability of eyewitness testi-
mony. In addition, research into the valence dimension 
should focus on how experiences evaluated as unpleasant 
are remembered, compared to neutral and pleasant ones.
Arousal
Besides negative emotions, a term frequently used in eye-
witness testimony research to describe an affective state 
is arousal. Arousal, along with valence, is considered a core 
dimension of emotional experience. The ability to evoke 
arousal distinguishes between emotions and other affective 
states, e.g. moods and attitudes, and fuels further action (Fri-
jda, 2004). It is a psychophysiological reaction to a stimulus, 
representing the activation of the autonomic nervous sys-
tem (ANS). Thus, a study involving arousal may examine 
an objectively measurable state, not only an individual’s 
subjective assessment. It is even more important, as some 
studies show, that self-reporting of arousal may differ from 
an objective measurement of ANS activation (e.g. Chivers, 
Seto, Lalumiere, Laan & Grimbos 2010; Salimpoor, Beno-
voy, Longo, Cooperstock & Zatorre, 2009).
In eyewitness testimony, research into arousal is often 
(although not exclusively) associated with the weapon focus 
effect. Thus, even though arousal is a neutral state, it is in 
eyewitness testimony research sometimes defined as nega-
tive (e.g. MacLin, MacLin & Malpass, 2001, Luna & Mar-
tin-Luengo, 2018) or as having implicit negative valence 
as it is evoked by unpleasant (crime-related) stimuli (e.g. 
Hämmerer et al, 2017).
This implicit negative valence may explain why, in con-
trast to general research on the arousal–memory relation-
ship that suggests increased accuracy of recollection of 
arousing stimuli (e.g. Bradley et al., 1992), some experi-
ments in forensic psychology show that arousal has a nega-
tive influence on eyewitness memory (e.g. Carlson, Dias, 
Weatherford & Carlson, 2017). However, it is important to 
underline alternative explanations that focus on the differ-
ences between central versus peripheral details (e.g. Kens-
inger, 2009), as well as the interview procedure (e.g. Quas 
& Lench, 2007).
When analysing studies on arousal and eyewitness testi-
mony, we can also notice that arousal is often treated as a 
nominal variable. Subjects are induced into high-arousal or 
low-arousal/non-arousal states. Yet, arousal as a physiologi-
cal reaction can be accurately measured. Thus, research does 
not need to limit its inference to a reduced problem. The 
issue of objective measures of emotional experience is fur-
ther elaborated in the subsection on emotion measurements.
To sum up, it is postulated, that research should, in terms 
of arousal, focus primarily on examining how different levels 
and patterns of ANS activity affect the processing of visual 
information and its coding in long-term memory. It is also 
important to keep in mind that arousal is fundamentally neu-
tral, but can be evoked by stimulus with negative, neutral 
and positive valence.
Stress
The lack of precision in the use of terms in eyewitness tes-
timony research is even more evident when we look at the 
term stress. One may feel that research on the eyewitness 
testimony mimics trends in society at large, in which the 
term is applied to describe very different mental states—
anxiety, fear, frustration, fatigue, sense of overwhelming 
or even anger. However, in eyewitness testimony research 
stress seems to describe properties of stimulus rather than 
eyewitness affective state. It is often a threatening, violent or 
demanding situation in which an individual often feels fear/
anxiety or experiences arousal. However, this stimulus-based 
conceptualisation of stress is questionable, as it ignores the 
core concept of psychological stress—individual differences 
in coping with stimuli.
Applying the concept of psychological stress scientifi-
cally has its theoretical connotations and methodological 
consequences. Established theories and models of stress usu-
ally focus on the relationship between the external demands 
of the stressor and an individual’s coping mechanism. One 
of the most prominent theories of stress, formulated by 
Lazarus (Lazarus & Launier, 1978), views stress as a rela-
tional concept, a form of transaction between a person and 
an environment. It emphasises the individual’s appraisal of 
the significance of the stimulus in relation to how it threatens 
subjectively-defined well-being, and whether available cop-
ing resources are enough to deal with this threat (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1986). Therefore, the term stress should be used 
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neither to describe a specific external stimulation (as it is not 
synonymous with negative stimulus) nor to define a specific 
pattern of emotional, physiological or behavioural reactions.
With this in mind, it is the author’s opinion that research 
on stress and memory should be focused on individual dif-
ferences, in particular examining why, for some eyewit-
nesses, stressful events are remembered better, while others 
tend to misrepresent events and misidentify suspects.
Moods
Even though emotions are the focal point of the paper, the 
issue of chronic moods requires a brief comment, as it is also 
a subject of research on eyewitness testimony. However, it 
is crucial to understand the difference between moods and 
emotions. While the latter are considered short, rapidly tran-
sient and intense affective states caused by a specific internal 
and external stimulus, moods are harder to define in terms of 
specific cause. As Frijda (1994, p. 59) believes, their object 
is ’the world as a whole’. They are also chronic and slowly 
passing, thus the disposition to experience a given mood 
allows us to draw conclusions about an individual’s person-
ality (Meyer & Shack, 1989).
Despite this clear distinction, many empirical studies use 
these concepts interchangeably. It is quite possible that arbi-
trary application of these terms may be a legacy of research 
on the mood-state dependent effect. In his classical paper on 
associative network theory, Bower (1981) evokes happiness 
and sadness, and uses the terms “emotions” and “moods”, 
to name those states. Since imagination guided by hypnotic 
suggestion was employed to induce them, mood is the term 
which seems more appropriate to describe the experience. 
Confusion also concerns the use of terms “sadness” and 
“happiness”, which are more often used to label discrete 
emotions than moods.
Thus, it is postulated to use distinctive terms for short 
affective states evoked in response to specific stimulus, and 
for chronic, general, diffuse affective state, which can be 
considered a disposition to experience certain emotions 
(mood-trait) or a long-lasting affective state (mood-state). 
Moreover when the mood type is taken into account, it is 
advised to use adjectives describing the valence of the mood, 
for example “depressive mood” rather than “sadness”, or 
“elated mood” rather than “joy” or “happiness”. As some 
evidence suggests that chronic moods may also influence 
eyewitness testimony, thus control for a dispositional mood 
can be also considered.
To sum up the deliberations on defining emotions, it is 
important to highlight the misuse of terms and concepts 
of emotions, with little regard to theory and achievements 
of research on emotions. Thus, it is postulated that a study 
should define the spectrum of affective experience precisely 
and in accordance with the chosen theoretical approach. It 
must go hand in hand with awareness of the consequences of 
that choice, imposed by the research subject and methodol-
ogy. Moreover, although both approaches to study emotions 
have their justification in the theory of emotions, it seems 
that in the case of eyewitness testimony research, the most 
appropriate would be to combine both. On the one hand, it 
would allow us to indicate what feelings accompany wit-
nesses depending on the type of crime observed (discrete 
approach). On the other, dimensional approach may help 
to determine the characteristics of the emotional stimulus 
which seems to be particularly threatening the reliability of 
the testimony.
Inducing emotions
Another area of doubt concerning research on eyewitness 
testimony is related to experimental manipulation, particu-
larly the methods of inducing affective states. In experi-
ments conducted in psychological labs, short films or movie 
clips presenting a simulated crime are the most frequently 
employed emotive stimuli. In fewer instances, a crime is 
staged, making the subjects real eyewitnesses to a false 
event. Researchers also use slide presentations with short 
narratives or photographs. Other methods of inducing emo-
tion include exposure to aversive stimuli, such as threat of 
an injection or mild electric shocks (see Deffenbacher et al., 
2004).
In research on chronic mood and its impact on eyewitness 
testimony, a different approach is often employed. Moods 
may be induced by techniques such as hypnotic suggestion, 
instruction to recall past events, reading statements related 
to certain moods (e.g. the Velten Mood Induction Procedure) 
or listening to music. In other cases, a different methodologi-
cal approach with quasi-experimental research and subjects 
recruited on the basis of their dispositional mood or mood 
disorders (e.g. depression) is adopted.
While focusing on emotions, the fundamental question 
when evaluating research design is whether such experimen-
tal manipulations are sufficient to evoke real emotions, simi-
lar to those experienced by eyewitnesses and consequently, 
the extent to which experimental studies can be generalised 
in the forensic context. As Yuille and Tollestrup (1992) 
argue, a typical laboratory eyewitness is a passive observer, 
not experiencing a sense of danger or involvement in the 
event. Their physical and psychological well-being is not 
under threat. Thus, the behaviour of witnesses in this setting 
is not representative of that of witnesses to actual crimes. 
With this in mind, one should consider what type of stimulus 
manipulation increases the chances of evoking real emo-
tions, not just a declaration of emotions.
In the author’s opinion, the strength of manipulation 
is derived from the level of the subject’s involvement in a 
study. Thus, in order to induce states as similar as possible 
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to those experienced by real eyewitnesses, the distance (both 
physical and psychological) between subject and stimulus 
should be minimised. This kind of approach is widely used 
in social psychology, noted for psychologically meaningful, 
high impact experimental manipulations (Amodio, Zinner 
& Harmon-Jones, 2007). However, it may be difficult to 
achieve through short films, presentations or photos pre-
sented on a TV or computer screen.
Films
Although there is evidence that films can induce emotions, 
and they are widely regarded as ecologically valid stimuli, 
they must meet several conditions. After examination of 
movie databases serving as archives of stimuli useful in 
laboratory studies (e.g. Carvalho, Leite, Galdo-Álvarez & 
Gonçalves, 2012; Gross & Levenson 1995), it can be con-
cluded that the most effective ones are expressive and emo-
tionally unambiguous. The duration of the video clip may 
also be meaningful. Most databases include clips that last 
from 40 s to less than three minutes, but Gross and Leven-
son’s (1995) research indicates that films longer than a few 
dozen seconds have a better chance of evoking emotions, 
especially more complex ones.2
The hypothetical mechanism explaining how movies can 
influence emotions, and in consequence beliefs, attitudes, 
or behaviour, is the transportation into narrative effect. This 
describes psychological immersion into a narrative, and its 
effect is particularly pronounced when the emotional state of 
individual pre-reading or pre-watching content is consistent 
with the emotional tone of the narrative (e.g. Green, Chat-
man & Sestir, 2012). It seems that videos capable of induc-
ing this effect have a greater chance of evoking emotional 
experiences comparable to those of eyewitnesses. How-
ever, it is difficult to meet these criteria with videos lasting 
30–40 s, devoid of context and lacking vivid, identifiable 
characters with whom a viewer can form an empathic bond, 
which seems to be an important component of an emotional 
experience of a film (Tan, 1995).
Therefore, it is postulated that, when a crime event is 
presented via video, it should be an engaging narrative 
that focuses the subject’s attention. It would also be good 
practice to assess the film before the experiment (in a pilot 
study) or after the presentation (manipulation check), to 
investigate its impact on at least three-dimensional space, 
which represents the valence of the stimulus, the intensity of 
subjectively perceived excitement, and the dominance (the 
degree to which the film was involving and allowed subjects 
to detach from external stimuli).
Virtual reality
Another way to simulate eyewitness experience in the safe 
and controllable setting of a laboratory is to use modern 
technologies. Virtual reality (VR) with high-quality equip-
ment provides a great opportunity for research into memory, 
as it allows the creation of a complex and rich environment 
that is fully under the control of the researcher. As goggles 
cut off external stimuli, VR minimises the distance between 
the observer and the scene, which increases immersion and 
allows transportation into a fictional event. Moreover, as 
many studies show, emotional, behavioural, and social reac-
tions of people are the same in virtual reality as in everyday 
life (e.g. Gamberini et al. 2015; Kozlov & Johansen, 2010; 
Riva et al. 2007). With today’s technological capabilities 
and relatively inexpensive equipment, VR may serve as a 
substitute not only for insufficiently involving films or video 
clips, but also field studies, hazardous because of possible 
uncontrolled variables affecting the result.
This method of experimental manipulation is nothing 
new. It has been successfully employed in many fields, eye-
witness testimony included (e.g. Kloft et al, 2020). A par-
ticularly interesting approach is to use tools that are already 
utilised in law enforcement training, based on real-life simu-
lators or large-screen video projections, not a programmed, 
thus artificial environment (e.g. Hulse & Memon, 2006; 
Stanny & Johnson, 2000). Provided they use equipment at 
the highest technological level, they can be highly realistic 
and involving, and thus, simulating a real experience.
Staged crime/live events
It seems that the most reliable way to simulate the experi-
ence of real eyewitnesses is to expose subjects to staged 
crime. Even though the crime is faked, an individual may for 
a moment experience real emotions, thus it meets the criteria 
of high ecological validity. The choice of such a method 
seems even more appropriate in the light of the evidence 
of differences in testimonies concerning live and recorded 
events (Ihlebæk, Løve, Erik Eilertsen & Magnussen, 2003). 
This kind of experimental manipulation is particularly useful 
in group conditions, where all participants watch the same 
event. Considering the high demands on the sample num-
bers, it may be harder to reproduce an identical event for a 
single participant. When deciding on this type of experimen-
tal manipulation, it is crucial to consider all ethical concerns 
as well.
To sum up the subsection on inducing emotion in a labo-
ratory setting, it is crucial to underline the need to simulate 
experiences resembling (at least to some extent) those of 
witnesses to the crime. This can be achieved when experi-
mental manipulation meets several criteria: (1) the stimulus 
is subjectively meaningful for the subjects; (2) psychological 
2 with exception of disgust, which seems particularly easy to evoke, 
almost instantly following the stimulus.
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and physical (even imagined) distance between stimulus 
and observer is short; (3) regardless of the chosen way of 
presenting the crime event, subjects find it absorbing, (4) 
emotions and involvement are meticulously examined. This 
approach avoids the risk of drawing incorrect conclusions 
about the relationship between emotions and memory based 
on ineffective stimulus manipulation, or on one that induces 
states other than those intended.
Measuring emotions
The choice of theoretical background in research on the 
impact of emotions on eyewitness testimony should have 
consequences related not only to how research questions are 
formulated and hypotheses tested, but also to the way in 
which the emotions are assessed and measured.
Self‑reports
Measures of the effects of an emotion can be generally 
categorised as objective (behavioural, physiological) or 
subjective (self-reports). The latter, in the form of quanti-
tative questionnaires, are the most common in eyewitness 
testimony research. They are used primarily due to conveni-
ence, arising from the ease and speed of collecting data and 
the lack of additional costs. However, as is often pointed 
out (e.g. Amodio, Zinner & Harmon-Jones 2007; Scherer, 
2005), the use of self-reports carries the risk of getting unre-
liable statements about the individual’s experience. Subjects 
may not only be unaware of their emotions, but could also 
intentionally or unintentionally, mislead the researcher as 
they try to fulfil the internalised expectations of the research.
Another concern about self-reports is related to their 
structure. The choice between the dimensional versus 
discrete approach should be reflected in a properly cho-
sen method of assessment. When it comes to the discrete 
approach, some doubts may arise when the list of labels 
is short, forcing an individual to choose one of them, even 
when they are uncertain about their own emotions. For 
instance, Yuille and Cutshall (1986) asked eyewitnesses of 
real crime to assess their level of stress on a seven-point 
scale, and to indicate any negative effects engendered by 
the incident (nightmares, sleeplessness). While the question 
of negative consequences may be a useful counterbalance 
for self-reports, limiting the questionnaire to one scale may 
have resulted in discovering artifacts. When subjects have 
only one option, they feel obliged to report anything, even 
if they perceive the event differently than assumed by the 
researcher.
Thus, it is postulated, any research in eyewitness testi-
mony which assumes a priori that the results of stimulation 
are negative should also give subjects sufficient options to 
assess a wider spectrum of emotions, positive included. The 
experimental situation itself can be seen as novel and inter-
esting, and some subjects in contact with unpleasant stimuli 
may react with a mixture of excitement and curiosity.
Still on the issue of scale, concerns about the psycho-
metric properties of Likert-type scales depending on rat-
ing format are also worth noting. As there is no room here 
for a detailed discussion, readers seeking a more advanced 
overview are directed to other papers focused on the issue 
(e.g.: Cummins & Gullone, 2000; Finstad, 2010; Leung, 
2011; Weijters, Cabooter & Schillewaert, 2010). However, 
it should be mentioned that there is substantial evidence 
showing that, as the internal structure of the scale does not 
lose its properties regardless of the number of points, the 
more points a scale has, the more skewness and kurtosis is 
reduced. Therefore, it is often suggested not only to aban-
don five-point scales, but even to use 11-points scales that 
increase sensitivity and follow the normal distribution.
In light of this, methodological considerations may be 
formulated in relation to studies that rely on scales with a 
small point range. Hypothetically, when a four-point scale 
is used (e.g. Houston, Clifford, Phillips & Memon, 2013), 
lacking a neutral point, skewness is expected. Thus, abnor-
mal data distribution is highly probable. Consequently, when 
our objective is to examine if there are differences in the 
assessment of emotions between conditions, we should not 
use parametric estimation tests unless our sample size is 
big enough to be resistant to non-normality. The T test, for 
instance, is invalid with small samples from non-normal 
distributions, and by using it we risk falsely rejecting the 
null hypothesis. On the other hand, non-parametric tests are 
underpowered to detect an effect, so they increase the risk of 
accepting a false null hypothesis (Conover, 1998).
Moreover, it is postulated to include the measurement of 
chronical affective states in research plan. As mentioned, 
moods can influence the formulation of testimony and, due 
to mood-congruency effect, enhance the impact of experi-
mental manipulation. Thus, controlling for that variable 
will help us estimate the interactions between emotions and 
moods, as well as eliminate the disruptive impact of opposite 
mood on stimulus manipulation. Questionnaires that allow 
diagnosis of dispositional mood, affective style or mood dis-
order are also recommended, as they can be help controlling 
for individual differences.
Psychophysiology
Another way to assess emotions uses objective measure-
ments of physiological correlates of affective states. Emo-
tions are accompanied by physiological arousal, which 
reflects the activation of the autonomic nervous system. The 
most common ways to measure it are to examine changes in 
electrodermal (EDA/GSR), cardiovascular and respiratory 
activity. Each has multiple indexes, which are evidence of 
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ANS activation and allow the conclusion that a subject is 
experiencing not only general arousal, but even emotions. As 
Kreibig’s (2010) review shows, there is convincing evidence 
of emotion-specific ANS activity. Thus, when adopting more 
than just one method to investigate autonomic response pat-
terns, it may be useful to discuss not only the dimension of 
core properties of emotional experience, but also the type of 
discrete emotion. However, it is crucial to note that consid-
eration of only one index is insufficient to indicate what kind 
of emotion is experienced. Moreover, individual differences 
in ANS activation should be always taken into account.
Taking into consideration the shortcomings of self-report-
ing, as well as the nature of emotions and their dimensions 
that allow us to objectively measure some aspects of emo-
tional experience, it is postulated that, in the case of research 
on how emotional events are remembered, a heterophenom-
enological approach should be adopted. This indicates both 
subjective (self-reports) and objective (psychophysiological) 
assessment of investigated variables, which may allow us to 
address discrepancies in previous research. When psycho-
physiological measurements are included, this may provide 
us with information on the nature of emotional engagement, 
demonstrating the effectiveness of experimental manipula-
tion. Thus, it may also serve as an additional manipula-
tion check. On the other hand, using self-reports gives us 
insight into subjective experiences, personal appraisals and 
assessments.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to present the theoretical and 
methodological shortcomings of research into the relation-
ship between emotions and eyewitness testimony. In light 
of contradicting results, it is crucial to indicate those areas 
of research that may be responsible for misrepresentation of 
memory performance.
The summary of the discussion on emotions and their 
impact on testimony constitutes a proposition of a frame-
work that would allow better comparisons between studies 
and explanations of conflicting results, while structuring 
knowledge that will eventually provide a complete theory 
of the influence of emotions on eyewitness testimony. The 
framework consists of the following steps:
1. Defining emotions and applying an approach to study
them
Even though there are no reasons to consider the dis-
crete approach as theoretically unsound, the advantage
of the dimensional model of emotions is primarily due
to the methodological consequences it imposes. When
both valence and arousal are considered, the researcher
is advised to apply two different methods of measure-
ment—self-reports with a multi-point Likert-like scale 
to assess valence, and psychophysiological measurement 
to study arousal. Although there are self-report meth-
ods to measure the intensity of emotional experience 
(e.g. Geneva Emotion Wheel3), it is crucial to note that, 
while intensity rating may correlate to arousal, it is not 
the same. Thus, other methods are required to measure 
arousal.
2. Inducing and manipulating emotions
To draw inferences about the impact of emotions on
eyewitness testimony, it is crucial to develop an effec-
tive experimental manipulation procedure. Emotions
are not induced simply because subjects are shown a
crime event on video. Watching staged, fictional crimi-
nal activity is part of everyday life in our modern world.
To simulate real eyewitness experience, the researcher
must create conditions that increase the subject’s per-
sonal involvement. This is possible if the stimulus has
meaning, absorbs attention and seems real. Thus, the
best methods to induce emotions are (1) staging crimes,
(2) playing virtual reality scenarios, and (3) presenting
films capable of evoking transportation into the narrative
effect.
3. A proper memory test
Even though emotions are the main interest of this
paper, a model framework for research must also
include guidelines on how to examine witnesses’ mem-
ory. Empirical findings suggest that the influence of
emotions depends on memory function. Thus, model
research should consider applying more than one way
of testing memory performance. Moreover, ecologically
valid memory tests reflect what is asked from a real eye-
witness. Therefore, it is advised to simulate police pro-
cedures for interviewing eyewitnesses, such as (1) free
recollection, which may allow us to answer the general
question on quantity of details remembered, forgotten or
distorted, (2) structured recollection, which may allow
us to distinguish between central and peripheral details
and how they are remembered, and (3) adequate eyewit-
ness identification procedure, which allows us to inves-
tigate if emotions can influence recognition, based on
quasi-automatic information processing.
4. Control for individual differences
Besides the main guidelines considering defining, evok-
ing and measuring emotions, as well as memory testing, 
3 The Geneva Emotion Wheel (Sacharin, Schlegel & Scherer, 
2012) is in fact a tool that combines the discrete and dimensional 
approaches. Thus, it is recommended for research into eyewitness tes-
timony. Labelling emotions may be helpful for comparing results and 




it is also advised to control for variables that may explain 
individual differences in regulating emotions and moods, for 
example personality traits or affective styles.
To sum up, this paper encourages more strictly empiri-
cal studies that ensure theoretical and ecological validity, 
so the research better represents eyewitness experience and 
can serve as its parallel. This includes (1) exploiting the 
legacy of the psychology of emotion and its rich theoretical 
background for more consistent and multifaceted research 
designs, (2) ensuring strong experimental manipulation that 
simulates the eyewitnesses’ experiences to the extent set by 
research ethics, and (3) adopting a heterophenomenological 
approach to measuring emotional experience. Meeting these 
postulates may help us to formulate a coherent theory on the 
impact of emotions on eyewitness testimony.
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